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1. Introduction 
It is an extremely common mistake.1 People think that our beliefs cannot attain any 
sort of positive epistemic status unless they are based on good reasons.2 According to 
the reasons-first approach to epistemic status, reasons and the possession of them are 
prior to status.3  In point of fact, the opposite is true.  When you know that something is 
true, it is true that you have reasons in your possession, but it is only once you know 
that you have these reasons.  There is nothing prior to knowing that puts these reasons 
in your possession.  Because of this, the proponents of reasons-first epistemology are 
mistaken in thinking that the possession of reasons is a necessary precondition for the 
attainment of status. Thus, there is an important sense in which knowledge comes first. 
It comes first in the sense that we first come to have reasons in our possession by 
coming to know that certain things are true.  Knowledge is first because it is distinctive.  
There is nothing else that could put us in a position to believe, do, or feel things for 
reasons. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I've benefitted from conversations with Maria Alvarez, Robert Audi, Bill Brewer, 
Wesley Buckwalter, John Callanan, Adam Carter, Elijah Chudnoff, Chris Cowie, 
Jonathan Dancy, Christina Dietz, Trent Dougherty, Julien Dutant, Mikkel Gerken, 
Sandy Goldberg, Ali Hasan, Scott Hagaman, John Hawthorne, Jennifer Hornsby, 
Robert Howell, Nick Hughes, John Hyman, Maria Lasonen-Aarnio, Dustin Locke, 
Heather Logue, Errol Lord, Jack Lyons, Brent Madison, Aidan McGlynn, Rachel 
McKinnon, Jon Matheson, Ram Neta, Duncan Pritchard, Susanna Siegel, Chris 
Tucker, John Turri, and Tim Williamson. 
2  Among the defenders of the view that justification requires the support of 
reasons/evidence are Comesana (2010), Conee and Feldman (2004), and McDowell 
(1998). While this view is commonly held, it is not commonly argued for. I have never 
seen an argument for it.  Some authors (e.g., Gibbons (2010)) define ‘reason’ as 
something that occupies a certain theoretical role (i.e., that of making things 
reasonable), but this approach trivializes the claim and conflicts with an approach that 
thinks that we have some independent grip on the notion of a reason. As I think the 
claim is non-trivial and think we have an independent grip on the notion, I won’t 
follow his lead. 
3 These reasons are usually understood as evidence. For arguments that a subject's 
reasons for believing things consists of a subject's (apparent) evidence, see Adler (2002) 
and Shah (2006).  A subject's reason for φ-ing is a motivating reason, a special kind of 
explanatory reason (i.e., a reason why a subject φ'd).  An important constraint on a 
theory of motivating reasons is that they can be good reasons to φ. See Dancy (2000).  
For a general discussion of the relationship between reasons of different kinds and the 
ontology of reasons, see Alvarez (2010) and Littlejohn (forthcoming).     
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 According to the knowledge-first view defended here, you cannot have a reason 
in your possession unless it's something you know.  Reasons are facts and the 
possession of them requires knowledge.  In defending this view, I shall defend a crucial 
part of the view that your evidence is all and only what you know (E=K). Much of the 
literature on E=K has been concerned with questions about whether evidence has to 
consist of truths, whether it can be inferential, and whether Gettier cases cause trouble 
for E=K.4 Defenders of E=K have done a nice job fending off challenges on these fronts, 
but some issues haven't been explored in sufficient depth.  It seems that knowledge 
requires justified or appropriate belief. If it does, E=K implies that your evidence 
includes p only if you appropriately or justifiably believe p.  If knowing p does require 
justifiably or appropriately believing p, E=K tells us two surprising things about the 
possession of evidence. The first is that you cannot possess something as evidence 
unless you believe it. This rules out the possibility that your non-inferential beliefs are 
justified by virtue of being supported by evidence.5 Some alternative story has to be 
told about how these beliefs attain positive epistemic standing. The second is that 
possession has to be understood in normative terms.  This rules out the possibility that 
the possession of evidence could play a grounding role, grounding epistemic statuses 
like justification, rationality, or knowledge.6 The possession of evidence cannot ground 
such statuses if the attainment of such statuses is required for a piece of evidence to be 
in your possession. 
 Proponents of the traditional reasons-first approach are likely to challenge both 
the idea that possession itself should be understood in normative terms and the idea 
that possession requires belief.  If they want to challenge these consequences of E=K, 
they'll need to offer their own answers to these two questions:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 McGlynn (2014) provides a detailed survey and critical discussion of this literature. 
5 For further defense of the idea that there’s nothing that’s your reason for believing p 
if your belief is non-inferential, see Littlejohn (forthcoming) and McGinn (2012).  One 
argument for the view that there’s nothing that’s your reason for believing p when that 
belief is non-inferential uses McDowell’s (1979) characterization of a subject’s reasons 
and points out that on this gloss only that which is known independently from 
believing p could be your reason for believing p.  Readers who want to insist that cases 
of non-inferential belief are cases in which there’s something that’s your reason for 
believing what you do are free to introduce their own conception of a subject’s reasons, 
but the standard glosses on it don’t allow for non-inferential beliefs to be based on 
reasons.  A simple point that’s often neglected is that Unger’s (1975) argument that all 
propositionally specified reasons have to be known to be a subject’s reasons holds true 
for all the relevant verbs, even those used to talk about beliefs that aren’t formed 
through inference. For further arguments for the knowledge requirement, see Hornsby 
(2007, 2008) and Hyman (1999). 
6 Conee and Feldman (2004) are the leading proponents of the view that evidence does 
play this grounding role. Littlejohn (2012, forthcoming) and Sylvan and Sosa 
(forthcoming) criticize their evidentialist view on the grounds that the possession of 
evidence has to be understood in normative terms, although they disagree about what 
is involved in possession.  Beddor (forthcoming) criticizes their grounding claim on the 
grounds that they use normative notions to identify the theoretical role that evidence 
occupies.  
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The Constitution Question: What are your reasons for 
believing what you do?  
The Possession Question: What does it take to have 
these reasons? 
We'll see that the answers available to the proponents of the reasons-first view aren't 
very good.  The proponents of the reasons-first approach cannot say that our evidence 
consists of the facts we know, so they turn to perception or perceptual experience to 
give them an account of constitution or possession. On one version of the view, 
evidence consists of experiences and having evidence is simply a matter of having 
these experiences. On another more promising version of the view, evidence consists 
of facts made manifest in successful perceptual engagement with our surroundings.  
We’ll see that neither approach works.  Once we see that, we’ll see that knowledge is 
distinctive and thus must come first in the sense that I’ve claimed.     
 Here is my plan of attack.  In §2, I shall argue against internalist versions of 
reasons-first epistemology.  Any view that offers acceptable answers to the constitution 
and possession questions has to explain how it's possible to believe, feel, and do things 
for reasons that are the facts that we have in mind when we believe, feel, and do things 
for reasons. Internalist views deny that this is possible, so they cannot explain what 
needs to be explained. In §3, I shall look at externalist versions of reasons-first 
epistemology according to which perception provides us with reasons.  I shall argue 
that perception isn’t the kind of thing that could provide you with reasons because 
perceptual contact doesn’t put you in a position to be guided by reasons that consist of 
facts. In §4, I shall conclude with an argument for a knowledge-first account of 
justification. 
 
2. Internalism 
In this section, we'll look at some views that combine the reasons-first approach to 
epistemic status with this supervenience thesis:  
Internalism: Necessarily, if two subjects are in the same 
non-factive mental states, these subjects have the very 
same evidence.7 
According to the internalists, it's not possible for you to have evidence that your 
systematically deceived counterparts don't have.  If you and your counterparts' both φ 
and your mental states stand in the same causal relations, you’ll φ for the very same 
reasons.  According to some internalists, this is part of the intuitive motivation for the 
view.  Many internalists think that it's intuitively obvious that (a) any reasons that your 
deceived counterpart has you'll have and (b) any reasons that you have will be reasons 
that your deceived counterpart has.  If there cannot be any difference in justificatory 
status without a difference in possessed reasons or evidence, the (purported) fact that 
these internal duplicates share the same reasons is supposed to explain why these 
subjects' beliefs are equally justified. 
 To flesh out the details of this internalist view, internalists have to say 
something about the constitution and possession of reasons. Internalism doesn't 
answer these questions directly. It only tells us that facts about such reasons (including 
facts about what's in your box of evidence) supervene upon your non-factive mental 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See Cohen (1984), Madison (2014), and Silins (2005) for a defense. 
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states.  This doesn't tell us whether a subject's evidence consists of mental states or 
events (statism), the contents of those states or events (propositionalism), or facts 
(factualism), but we'll see that once we see what reasons are and what's sufficient for 
their possession that the internalists are mistaken.8 
 Many internalists now identify a subject's evidence or a subject's reasons for her 
beliefs with states of mind.  On this approach, having a reason or a piece of evidence is 
simply a matter of having an attitude or an experience.  A proponent of reasons-first 
epistemology needs an account of possession that doesn't require a belief that attains 
positive standing to possess a reason and this approach would seem to meet this 
constraint. 
 While Davidson defended the view that only beliefs could be reasons for belief, 
most statist internalists defend the view that experiences constitute our reasons for 
belief.  Consider, for example, Dougherty and Rysiew's experience-first view.9 As they 
see it, experience is "first ... in the order of immediacy: in short, experience is where we 
begin" (2013: 17).  Elaborating on this theme, they say:  
This is where experience is first: in the quest for true 
belief, justification, knowledge, understanding, and 
wisdom we have no other starting point than experience. 
Our experiences ... are our basic evidence, in the light of 
which all else that is evident is made evident. Experiences 
play well the roles that characterize evidence (2013: 17). 
And later:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 For defenses of the statist view, see Brueckner (2009), Cohen (1984), Conee and 
Feldman (2008), Dougherty and Rysiew (2013), Gibbons (2010), Haack (2009), Lyons 
(2009), McCain (2014), Mitova (forthcoming), and Turri (2009).  For defenses of 
propositionalism, see Dougherty (2011), Fantl and McGrath (2009), Miller (2008), and 
Schroeder (2008, 2011).  For defenses of factualism, see Alvarez (2010), Hornsby (2007, 
2008), Hyman (1999), Littlejohn (2012), Unger (1975), and Williamson (2000).  Most 
participants to this debate aren’t terribly concerned about the relationship between 
propositions and facts and are happy to say that they think of true propositions as 
facts. Thus, the crucial difference between the propositionalist and factualist view is on 
whether p’s being a reason depends, in part, upon whether p is true.  Because of this 
difference, I take the propositionalist approach to be unacceptable. Here’s a quick 
argument. If your reason for φ-ing was that p, you φ’d because p. (If it’s not true that 
you φ’d because p, the claim that your reason for φ-ing was that p would be mistaken.)  
The sentences ‘You fell because the floor was slippery’, ‘The chocolate melted because 
the radiator was on’, and ‘You went to the store because you were out of gin’ are true 
only if the floor was slippery, the radiator was on, and you were out of gin.  I won’t 
discuss the propositionalist view further here as I have yet to see any response to this 
argument. 
9 Experience-first can be understood as a version of the reasons-first view.  That's how 
I'll understand it here.  The experience-first view can be understood as a view on 
which a subject's evidence consists of experiences, but it can be understood to include 
views like McDowell's on which reasons are facts that are made manifest in 
experience.  
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Any chain of cited evidence must end with the way the 
world appears to us to be. So on this view, experience is 
first in that it inhabits the ground floor of the intellectual 
evidence (2013: 18). 
Is this right? Does our ultimate evidence consist of experiences? 
 Davidson thought not. It's instructive to consider his argument.  Davidson 
(2001: 141) argued that the only thing that could be a reason for a belief would be 
another belief on the grounds that only that which stands in a logical relation to a 
belief could serve as a reason for it.  When it comes to belief, nothing could be a reason 
to believe p unless it stood in some sort of logical relation to p. Relatedly, nothing could 
function in reasoning as my reason to believe p unless it was something I took to stand 
in a logical relation to p.  If I don't take there to be some logical connection between p 
and q, q cannot be what convinced me that p by settling the question whether p.  As 
such, it's hard to see how it could be my reason. 
 A standard statist response is to say that experiences can stand in logical 
relations because of their contents.  This is a muddle.  It's a muddle because the 
response assumes that if experiences are like beliefs in having content, they could be 
like beliefs in being reasons. Beliefs aren't reasons.  Arguing that experiences are like 
beliefs isn't a particularly good strategy for trying to show that experiences are reasons. 
It's a good strategy for showing that they cannot be reasons.  Neither beliefs nor 
experiences stand in logical relations.  Experiences are events.  They are datable, 
coarse-grained particulars.  Datable occurrences and coarse-grained particulars don't 
stand in logical relations or constrain rational degrees of belief.   They don't entail 
anything and they aren't entailed by anything.  If experiences had contents (more on 
this below), their contents might stand in logical relations and be good candidates for 
playing the role of reason, but as experiences aren't their contents, it doesn't follow 
from the fact that contents stand in logical relations that experiences do.  Your reasons 
for feeling, doing, or believing things are things that can figure in reasoning. What 
figures in reasoning as things that you reason from (i.e., reasons) are things that are 
propositional (i.e., facts or propositions), not things that have contents that are 
propositional (i.e., states of mind).   
 Properly understood, Davidson's logical relations argument rules out both his 
view that identifies epistemic reasons with beliefs and any version of the experience-
first view that identifies epistemic reasons with experiences.  What Davidson's 
argument shows is that reasons have to be propositions or facts, the things that we 
have in mind when we believe, feel, or do things for reasons, not things in the head when 
we believe, feel, or do things for reasons.  Our reasons for believing, feeling, and doing 
things couldn't be things in the head because (a) our reasons for believing, feeling, and 
doing things are things that we take to merit or make appropriate these responses and 
(b) we all know full well that such things are the things we have in mind, not the states 
of mind themselves.10    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Following Dancy (2000) we should say that a subject's reasons are the kinds of things 
that can be good reasons since it's possible to φ for a reason that's a good reason to φ.  
Since the good reasons there are to φ are facts, not states of mind or their false 
contents, Dancy's constraint supports the view that reasons are facts. 
 6 
 Consider the case of emotion.  There is a reason why Agnes is upset and then 
there is Agnes' reason for being upset with the neighbors upstairs.  When we use the 
possessive construction to talk about Agnes' reasons (i.e., motivating reasons), we're 
interested in reasons that help us see what it was from Agnes' point of view that was so 
upsetting. This has to be something that helps us to understand why, from her 
perspective, it makes sense to be upset or why it's appropriate to be upset with the 
neighbors upstairs.  If you saw things as she did, it would be something like the fact 
that they make so much noise and sign for your packages without ever bringing them 
down.  For this reason, a motivating reason has to be something Agnes is cognizant of 
and so there are epistemic constraints on the proper ascription of motivating reasons.11 
To be Agnes' reason for being upset with the neighbors upstairs, something has to be 
something that Agnes is both cognizant of and averse to. It has to be something that 
Agnes wants not to be.12   
 If we follow the statists lead in identifying Agnes' reasons for believing things 
with states of mind, we'd have to identify Agnes' reasons for feeling things with those 
same states of mind. It's possible to believe something for the very same reason that 
you feel something. If Agnes heads upstairs to confront her neighbors, her reason for 
believing that she should go confront them could be her reason for heading upstairs 
and her reason for being upset with the neighbors upstairs. There's no good statist 
candidate to play the role of Agnes' reason for being upset with her neighbors, so 
there's no good statist candidate to play the role of Agnes' reason for believing that she 
should go complain. 
 Remember that Agnes' reason for being upset is something that she desires not 
to be the case.  Maybe she believes that the neighbors upstairs signed for one of her 
packages and are conspiring to keep it.  She wants her wine and so wants them not to 
keep it.  She doesn't want not to believe that the neighbors are holding onto her wine.  
Her anger has to do with their actions, not her attitudes.  The reason that this is trouble 
for the statist is that the statist has to identify all of a subject's reasons with that 
subject's attitudes and that's just a deeply implausible account of what Agnes' reason is 
for being upset with her neighbors.  Once we see that, it's easy to see that statism is a 
deeply implausible account of what Agnes' reason is for believing that she should go 
complain. It's also a deeply implausible account of what her reason is for heading 
upstairs to demand the return of her package. 
   Agnes' reasons are facts about the situation. They are the facts that she has in 
mind when she believes things, feels things, or does things for reasons. Agnes isn't 
different from us. Her reasons are the kinds of things that our reasons are.  The trouble 
with internalism is that it conflicts with the idea that Agnes' reason for being upset 
could have been something that the neighbors have done or are doing.  Notice that if 
Agnes' reason for being upset with the neighbors didn't merit this kind of affective 
response, her emotional response wouldn't be fitting.  If, say, the package she saw 
being carried upstairs belonged to them, she might be angry with the neighbors, but 
her being angry with them wouldn't be fitting.  A fitting emotional response requires 
that a subject’s reason for having that emotional response is the fact that merits that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 This doesn't hold for all explanatory reasons, mind you.  If you are deceived by a 
demon, that's one reason why you'd think that you had hands. It's not your reason for 
thinking you have hands! 
12 See Gordon (1987) for discussion. 
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response.  Any view that implies, as internalism and statism do, that a subject’s reason 
for her emotional responses couldn’t be the facts that merit such a response imply that 
fitting emotional responses are impossible.  Let’s add this to the long list of reasons for 
rejecting this approach to reasons.13     
 I've argued that it would be a mistake to follow the statists and the internalists 
in characterizing a subject's reasons as consisting of states of mind or experiences.  A 
subject's reasons for believing, feeling, and doing things will be facts about the 
situation that she has in mind and the proponents of reasons-first or experience-first 
epistemology have to explain how this is possible.  
 
3. Externalism 
Any view that gives us acceptable answers to the constitution and possession questions 
has to explain how it's possible to believe, feel, and do things for reasons that consist of 
the facts you have in mind when you believe, feel, and do things for reasons.  Since 
internalist views deny that your reason for φ-ing could be such things, these views are 
unacceptable.  We cannot think of your reasons for φ-ing as consisting of states in 
mind or the contents of such states and we cannot think of your reasons for φ-ing as 
consisting of facts about your own mind.  Thus, while states of mind and mental events 
have some sort of rational role to play, they play a role in providing reasons, a role they 
play without being reasons.  My proposal is that only knowledge provides reasons in the 
sense that matters here: it's only when you know p that you could φ where your reason 
for φ-ing could be that p where you don't have to first change your mind about whether 
p.  If this is right, knowledge plays a distinctive role in our story about how we're 
guided by reasons. If my opponents are right, something else can play this role.    
 I want to begin by highlighting three constraints that something has to meet if 
it's going to figure in an account of possession.  The first constraint has to do with 
ability. Consider Nozick's experience machine. Agnes undergoes a series of experiences 
that dispose her to form false beliefs about her surroundings. It seems to her that she 
and everyone she cares about are flourishing.  In the standard telling, her beliefs are all 
mistaken.  This isn't essential to the story. Agnes can be cut off from reality even if 
some of her beliefs happen to be true. Let's suppose that it seems to her that her 
brother has just crossed the stage at graduation and a smile stretches across Agnes' face 
because she believes he just graduated.14  What the lab technicians don't realize is that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13  In Littlejohn (2012), I offer further arguments against statist and internalist 
approaches to reasons of all sorts and try to address all the main arguments for these 
approaches in the literature. 
14 In the bad case, she can φ because she believes p without φ-ing for the reason that p. 
In the bad case, the fact that her brother just received his diploma is not her reason for 
smiling or cheering. In the bad case, there's nothing that could be Agnes' reason for 
being so happy but there are reasons why she's happy. In the good case, her reason for 
being happy might well be that her brother just received his diploma. If so, that's a 
reason why she's smiling and a reason why she's happy.  In this case it's also true that 
she's smiling and she's happy because she believes her brother just graduated. There's 
no competition in describing the good case between the fact about the situation and 
the fact about her mental life.  For further discussion of these kinds of points, see 
Alvarez (2010) and Littlejohn (2012).  Some critics think that it's a weakness of this view 
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precisely as Agnes undergoes this experience her brother crosses the stage and accepts 
his diploma.  While she believes correctly that her brother is graduating and is happy 
because she believes this, her reason for being happy isn't that her brother is 
graduating.  She cannot be rationally guided by such a fact, not when she's cut off from 
reality. 
 If p is your reason for φ-ing, you have to have the ability to be guided by the fact 
that p and that requires a non-accidental connection to it, one that's missing from the 
Gettiered version of Nozick's experience machine.  This is the ability problem, the 
problem of stating a suitable account of what would eliminate the accidental 
connection between belief and fact so that if you φ in the belief that p, your reason for 
φ-ing could be that p.15 
 The second constraint has to do with rational authority. Acquiring evidence is 
supposed to improve your epistemic position.  When you have it, you're supposed to 
have the authority to treat the relevant reason as a reason in your deliberation.  If your 
true belief isn't rationally held, you won't have the entitlement to include p in your 
reasoning.  Thus, whatever condition or conditions we take to be sufficient for 
possession, we have to think of these condition or conditions as sufficient for 
underwriting an undefeated entitlement or warrant to treat p as a reason. 
 The third constraint has to do with the generality of reasons and the role of 
conceptual capacities in coming to possess them.  Davidson's argument tells us that 
reasons stand in logical relations, relations that only facts or propositions can stand in.  
The facts that we're primarily interested in are those that make perceptually based 
predicative judgments true.  Such judgments are true only if some particular, a, 
belongs to some category by being an F. To grasp such reasons, we have to grasp the 
fact that some particular case belongs to a range of possible cases:  
A concept, as I will speak, is always of (being) such-and-
such. As such it has a certain sort of generality ... It may 
be, necessarily, of just one thing. There may even be one 
thing it is necessarily of. Still, there is a sort of generality 
it has. Suppose a concept were of being Frege. To fit that 
concept one could stop nowhere short of being him. But 
suppose (if you can) Frege had taken to wearing a beret, 
or had devoted his life to sailing. He would have been 
different than he was. Still, he would have fit that concept 
... There being at least one such range of cases is one thing 
one might mean by generality. It is what I will mean here 
by the generality of the conceptual. The key feature of the 
conceptual, on its present understanding, is that for 
anything conceptual there is a specific form of generality 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
that we can't say what it is in the bad case that was Agnes' reason was for being happy.  
It's not a weakness; it's a strength.  Some critics try to identify that reason but then say 
obviously false things about what it is (e.g., a falsehood or a state of mind). Other critics 
criticize my proposal but (wisely) don't try their hand at specifying what this reason is.   
15 While Hyman (1999), Littlejohn (2012), McDowell (1998), Mantel (2013), and Unger 
(1975) have a non-accidental connection requirement in their accounts of possession, 
not everyone agrees that this is a genuine desiderata. See Hofman (2014) for discussion. 
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intrinsic to it. There is then a range which is the range of 
cases, or circumstances, which would be ones of 
something instancing that generality (Travis 2013: 125). 
To grasp such things requires the use of conceptual capacities, capacities to grasp that 
a particular belongs to a range of cases.  If something doesn't involve the actualization 
of any such capacities, it doesn't relate us to the general and if something doesn't 
involve the requisite sort of generality it cannot be the sort of thing that could be true 
or false. Since reasons are truths, truths involve this sort of generality, and getting a 
grip of such generalities requires the use of conceptual capacities, the account of 
possession has to implicate these conceptual capacities. 
 Proponents of the knowledge-first approach can tick all the boxes. If knowledge 
is the ability to be guided by reasons that consist of facts, the ability problem doesn't 
arise for E=K.16 Even if we reject this identification, knowledge involves a non-
accidental connection to truth.  The ability problem arises most sharply in those cases 
where the connection between belief and truth is accidental.  As for the authority 
problem, it seems that this problem doesn't arise for E=K because anything known is 
justifiably believed.  To justifiably believe something, you must have sufficient 
epistemic authority to include p in some of your reasoning or deliberation.  Finally, it's 
clear that knowledge involves the exercise of the relevant conceptual capacities. 
 If knowledge is unique in meeting these three constraints, it is distinctive in just 
the way I claim. Its being unique in meeting these three constraints means that there's 
nothing apart from knowledge that involves the exercise of the conceptual capacities 
that must be activated for you to be rationally guided by the fact that a is F where you 
have both the ability and the authority to treat the fact that a is F as a reason for φ-ing. 
Not everyone thinks that knowledge is unique in this way, for it's now widely believed 
that perception can meet these constraints, too.  If perception can tick all three boxes, it 
could provide reasons that could be the rational basis for your non-inferential 
perceptual beliefs. It could do the work I’ve claimed can only be done by knowledge.  
For it to do this work, however, it would have to tick all three boxes. In what follows, 
I’ll argue that it cannot.    
   
3.1 Reasons-First and the Reconciliatory View of Perception 
In §3.1-3.3 I'll argue against a conjunction of these claims:  
Perceptual Sufficiency: Perceptual relations alone 
between you and your surroundings can put you in the 
position to believe things for reasons that consist of facts. 
Perceptual Dependence: Perceptual knowledge is 
possible only when the subject's perceptual beliefs are 
held for reasons where these reasons are independently 
possessed because the subject bears the right perceptual 
relations to her surroundings. 
My argument starts from the assumption that perception is fundamentally a relation 
between a perceiver and things in her surroundings that perception brings into view.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 For defense of this approach, see Hyman (1999). 
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If this relationalist picture of perception is correct, we should reject the conjunction of 
Perceptual Sufficiency and Dependence.17    
 As the case for the relationalist view has been made elsewhere, I’ll assume that 
it’s correct and assume that the proponents of reasons-first epistemology will take this 
view on board.  An important question is whether we can reconcile this approach to 
perception with the claim that perceptual experience has a representational content by 
virtue of involving the subject’s conceptual capacities. According to reconciliatory views 
experience can be both relational and representational:  
Perception makes knowledge about things available by 
placing them in view for us.  But it is precisely by virtue of 
having content as they do that perceptual experiences 
puts us in such relations to things (McDowell 2013: 144). 
  To start my case against the use of reconciliatory views by proponents of the 
reasons-first approach, consider the first reconciliatory view:  
The First Reconciliatory View: When we have 
perceptual knowledge that a is F, it's the result of seeing 
that a is F.  By seeing that a is F, we'll either have the fact 
that a is F or the fact that we see that a is F as part of our 
evidence.18  Seeing that a is F is understood as standing in 
the right visual relation to things in your surroundings 
and the fact that a is F is understood as the object of 
visual awareness.  Having such facts as reasons requires 
an appropriate exercise of conceptual capacities (e.g., 
seeing that a is F requires exercising the conceptual 
capacities involved in characterizing something as an F), 
but seeing that a is F is nevertheless a relational affair.19 
This view would appear to be the view that McDowell (1998) defends, a view he 
recently described as follows:  
Suppose I have a bird in plain view, and that puts me in a 
position to know non-inferentially that it is a cardinal. It 
is not that I infer that what I see is a cardinal from the way 
it looks ... I can immediately recognize cardinals if the 
viewing conditions are good enough ... Since my 
experience puts me in a position to know non-
inferentially that what I see is a cardinal, its content 
would have to include a proposition in which the concept 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 I cannot hope to give a defense of this idea here. For defenses of this idea, see Brewer 
(2011), Logue (this volume), Martin (2009), and Travis (2011, 2013). Ginsborg (2011), 
Logue (2014), McDowell (2009), and Schellenberg (2014) all defend reconciliatory views 
that are supposed to reconcile representational and relational views of perception.    
18 According to McDowell (2006), a subject’s reason for believing p is never p, so he 
thought that a subject’s reason for believing p would be that she saw that p.  Pritchard 
(2012) defends a similar view.  Hopp (2012) and Schroeder (2011, forthcoming) hold that 
p can be a subject’s reason for believing p. I think McDowell is right that your reason 
for believing p could never be p, but nothing turns on this issue here. 
19 McDowell once defended this sort of view, but he's since modified his position. 
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of a cardinal figures: perhaps one expressible ... by saying 
"That's a cardinal" (2009: 259). 
Initially, it will help to focus on this view because it is a version of the reasons-first 
view that has these two features:  
Visualism: Facts about possessed reasons for visual 
beliefs supervene upon facts about a subject's visual 
contact with her surroundings.   
Content Constraint: If S knows visually that a is F, S's 
visual experience has the representational content that a 
is F.  
Visualism is a crucial assumption in McDowell's epistemological argument for his 
disjunctivist conception of experience according to which your experience can be a 
matter of some fact, such as the fact that a is F, being made manifest.  Such a fact is 
made visually manifest iff the subject sees that a is F.  This fact being made visually 
manifest is, in turn, supposed to put you in a position to be rationally guided by it (i.e., 
to be in a position to believe things for the reason that a is F or for the reason that you 
see that a is F).20  If Visualism is false, it's possible for two subjects to stand in the very 
same perceptual relations to their environments and yet possess different reasons for 
their perceptual beliefs.  The difference in reasons wouldn't be traced to a difference in 
what they saw or what their experiences were like, so it would be beyond their ken.  
The subject that had reasons inaccessible to the second subject would thus enjoy an 
epistemic benefit because of something beyond her ken. For McDowell, this isn't 
allowed.  Since nothing can confer any sort of epistemic benefit upon you unless it's 
within your ken, there must be some difference in the subjects' experiences that 
corresponds to the difference in the reasons they possess.  This is just what Visualism 
says. 
 The Content Constraint captures the idea that there's a match between the 
content of perceptual beliefs that constitute knowledge and the content of the 
perceptual experiences that provide the reasons that put us in a position to know the 
things we know in forming such beliefs.  McDowell acknowledges that the Content 
Constraint could only be true if the conceptual capacities exercised in believing that a 
is F are active in the experience you have when you see that a is F.  As the passage 
above makes clear, the content of an experience, which is due to the exercise of 
conceptual capacities, helps determine what's presented to us in experience. He would 
reject the idea that these capacities operate on that which is made present in 
experience anyway independently from the exercise of these conceptual capacities.  
Mere sensibility, he’d say, doesn’t bring things into view, but only does so in concert 
with the operation of the understanding. 
 One way to put pressure on the first reconciliatory view is to think about 
environmental luck cases. These are cases in which a subject lucks into a true belief by 
correctly predicating a property to some object even though she easily could have 
mistakenly predicated this property to a ringer and thereby ended up with a false 
belief.  In a suitably good case, it seems that we can know by looking that something is 
a barn, say, which gives us (1):  
1. In the good case, it's possible to have perceptual 
knowledge expressed by, 'This structure is a barn'. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 See McDowell (1998). 
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2. The subject has this perceptual knowledge only 
because the experience has the same content as this 
belief and because this experience justifies beliefs with 
this content [(1), Visualism and the Content 
Constraint]. 
3. In a correlative bad environmental luck case, a subject 
could stand in the same visual relations to her 
environment that our first subject stands in with 
respect to hers but the belief she expresses by saying, 
'This structure is a barn' wouldn't constitute 
knowledge.  
4. This subject would have the very same reasons for her 
perceptual beliefs and an experience that would justify 
the belief expressed by, 'This structure is a barn' and 
would believe for the very same reason as the subject 
in the good case [(3) and Visualism]. 
5. The subject in the bad case would thus know that the 
structure is a barn [(4) and the assumption that if you 
believe something for the reason that p, you can φ for 
the reason that p if you φ in the belief that p]. 
This is an inconsistent tetrad.  Something has to give.   
 Someone could block the reasoning that generates the inconsistency at the 
outset by denying (1), but if we do this and leave the background restrictions in place, 
we'll end up having to say that perceptual knowledge is limited to knowledge of 
appearances. Any perceptible feature of a thing can appear to be different than it is. In 
light of this, it seems we should be able to generate fake barn style cases for a wide 
range of properties (e.g., a person's identity, a person's mood, the colors of surfaces, the 
kind of thing a thing is, etc.).  We should be able to tell by looking what color a thing is 
if we're in ideal conditions, so (1) should stay. 
 It looks like (5) follows from (4).  Suppose you believed that you were out of gin 
for the reason that one of your guests just poured the remaining gin into the shaker.  If 
this is your reason for believing this, this could be your reason for being disappointed 
and your reason for reaching for the vodka.  It couldn’t your reason for feeling this or 
doing that unless you knew that one of your guests just poured the remaining gin into 
the shaker.  You can only believe something for the reason that p if you’re able to 
believe, do, and feel further things for that reason.  Thus, if responding in these further 
ways requires knowledge of p, your belief in p would have to constitute knowledge. 
 McDowell suggests, in keeping with his view, that a subject in an 
environmental luck case neither sees that the structure is a barn nor knows that it's a 
barn.  Since he wants to use the visual relations the subject bears to her environment 
to determine what she's in a position to know, it looks like he'll have to abandon 
Visualism, the Contest Constraint, or (3). Unfortunately, it seems that (3) is rather 
plausible, particularly if you think, as he does, that his view vindicates the intuitions 
that relationalists appeal to in motivating their view, such as the intuition that, 
"perception places our surroundings in view" (2008: 14). The presence or absence of 
unseen fakes should have no bearing whatever upon whether vision places your 
surroundings in view for you. 
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 Some writers have tried to turn this objection on its head, arguing that the kind 
of perceptual relations we stand in when we're in the environmental luck cases are 
actually good enough for something epistemically good. Turri (forthcoming) suggests 
that the relations provide knowledge. Hughes (2014) thinks that it puts us in a position 
to believe things for the reasons that are the facts we see even if we don't know them to 
obtain:  
In Fake Barns, the fact that there is a barn is (along with 
various facts about Henry) one of the causes of Henry’s 
belief that there is a barn. It  figures in a causal 
explanation of why Henry believes what he does (Hughes 
2014: 459).21 
If I understand the thought here, the idea is that the target fact (i.e., that the building is 
a barn) explains the belief that there's a barn on the hillside in just the same way it 
would if there weren't any fakes present. We'd agree that a subject's reason for doing 
things could be that the structure is a barn if the subject is in the good case, so we have 
to admit that it's the subject's reason in the bad. 
 The guiding idea seems to be that perceptual contact with the subject of 
predication and veridical experience is sufficient for putting the subject in a position to 
do things for the reason that's the target fact because the same explanatory relations 
holds between that fact and your attitudes in the environmental luck case as hold in 
the correlative good case in which the fakes are removed.  I think this is a mistake. 
While the causal relations between the barn and its properties might be the same in 
the good case and bad, it doesn't follow that the facts about the barn play the same 
explanatory role in the two cases.  Cases should make this clear. 
 Consider two cases: 
Lucky Penny: Jill has a lucky penny. She hasn’t seen 
other pennies before. Her brother stole her lucky penny 
and took it with him to school. He dropped it. Someone 
picked it up but later dropped it. It worked its way across 
the city. A week later Jill was on a school trip when she 
looked down and saw a penny that happened to be her 
lucky penny. “It’s my lucky penny!” she said.  
White Diamond: Agnes had a bucket of fake diamonds 
marked 'diamonds' that she left in her flat to attract the 
attention of any jewel thieves that might break in. Each 
stone in the bucket looked like a real diamond. What she 
didn't realize is that one of the hundreds of stones in the 
bucket was indeed a real diamond. That stone happened 
to be sitting on top. A thief knocked the bucket over 
clumsily, saw the stones spilled across the floor, saw that 
the bucket was labeled diamonds, and grabbed the first 
stone that she could believing it to be a diamond. She left 
the others because she thought that she heard someone 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 I used to think he was right, but I now think that it's not for reasons discussed in 
Littlejohn (2014).  Like Carter (2013) and Jarvis (2013), I’m skeptical of the idea that the 
environmental luck cases are cases in which the correctness of your predication is 
attributable to the exercise of your abilities.   
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coming. She happened to grab the only diamond in the 
flat and believes that she has a diamond.  
These are similar to environmental luck cases insofar they involve veridical experience 
and simple seeing with nothing that interferes 'in between' the subject and the fact.  
These cases strike me as being clear non-knowledge cases and it's clear, I think that the 
facts they believe to hold cannot rationally guide them or be their reasons for 
believing, feeling, or doing things.  If the combination of simple seeing and veridical 
experience bringing about a true belief were sufficient for the target facts to be the 
causal explanation of the belief, we'd have to say that the fact that Agnes took a 
diamond explains why she believes she has a diamond and the fact that the penny Jill 
sees is her lucky penny explains why she believes what she does. I don't think their 
beliefs are explained by these facts, for while they see the relevant objects and have 
veridical experiences, the features of the things that they see don't enable them to 
recognize, say, that the rock is a diamond or that the penny is the lucky penny.  That's 
because recognizing the penny as the lucky penny or the diamond as a diamond is 
possible only if these things have a distinctive look that would trigger a disposition to 
classify these things in the relevant ways. Since they don't have this look, the 
correctness of the classification cannot be attributable to the subject's sensitivity to the 
features of the objects that would show that the relevant facts obtained (i.e., that the 
stone is a diamond and that the penny is the particular penny). Once we see that, we 
see that the subject's beliefs aren't explained by the target facts, in which case the case 
against (3) fails. 
 
3.2 The Second Reconciliatory View 
It might seem that the problems that have to do with environmental luck call only for a 
minor modification of the first reconciliatory view. The minor modification just 
involves adding some further condition or conditions to rule out environmental luck: 
The Second Reconciliatory View: When we have 
perceptual knowledge that a is F, it's the result of seeing 
that a is F.  By seeing that a is F, we'll either have the fact 
that a is F or the fact that we see that a is F as part of our 
evidence.  Seeing that a is F is understood as standing in 
the right visual relation to things in your surroundings 
when further conditions are met (i.e., conditions that 
don't supervene upon the visual relations between the 
perceiver and her environment). Having such facts as 
reasons requires an appropriate exercise of conceptual 
capacities (e.g., seeing that a is F requires exercising the 
conceptual capacities involved in characterizing 
something as an F), but seeing that a is F is nevertheless a 
relational affair.22 
I don't think minor modifications will work. For a starter, it's hard to see that there's 
anything left of the idea that a fact is an object of visual awareness once it's conceded 
that visual relations along won't determine whether the subject sees that a is F. If 
seeing that a is F is a visual relation, whether you see that a is F has to supervene upon 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 This seems to be the sort of view that Pritchard (2012) defends. 
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purely visual relations between a perceiver and her environment because everything 
supervenes upon itself.23 
 If seeing that a is F depends upon further conditions, conditions that don't 
supervene upon visual relations between a perceiver and her environment, it's just not 
clear what the reconciliatory view's positive proposal is.  It's clear what the proposal 
cannot be. It's clear that the proposal cannot be one according to which a perceiver 
stands in the relation of visual awareness to something that's her reason and thereby is 
able to believe things for reasons that she's visually aware of. Holding relations of 
visual awareness fixed we can modify the further conditions and thereby determine 
whether the subject sees that a is F and whether the subject can believe things for 
either the reason that a is F or the reason that she sees that a is F. 
 To put to rest the idea that it's visual awareness that puts us in a position to 
believe things for reasons, consider an argument distilled from Travis' work: 
The Generality Argument 
1. Everything we perceive is particular.  
2. The facts that we know perceptually aren't particular, 
but general, as they are facts that have to do with the 
categories that the particulars we see belong to. 
3. Thus, the objects of perceptual awareness are not the 
objects of perceptual knowledge. 
What we see when we see some particular in our surroundings isn't that the particular 
fits into a class of similar things:  
But don’t we see that the sun has risen? And don’t we thus 
also see that this is true? That the sun has risen is no 
object which sends out rays that reach my eyes, no visible 
thing as the sun itself is (Frege quoted in Travis 2013: 123).   
What we see in our surroundings and what we know about these things belong on 
different sides of Frege's line. On the left are the particulars that instance generalities 
and on the right we find the conceptual, the representational, and the general (Travis 
2013: 126). The stuff on the right represents the stuff on the left as belonging to 
categories or kinds. 
 Once we appreciate this point, we cannot say that perception takes in some fact 
or something that involves the generality that facts have and thereby places a reason 
before us that we might use to come to know how things are.  All that perception can 
do is place particulars in view.  At this stage, people often say that they appreciate the 
force of this point but see no need to abandon the reconciliatory view.  Even if the 
fundamental relation is between a perceiver and the particulars she sees, mightn't she 
also have an experience while she sees the things she does where this experience has a 
representational content that enables her to believe things for reasons connected to 
this content?  Provided that we don't claim to perceive the content, isn't such a view 
perfectly compatible with Travis' Fregean insight? 
 Ultimately, I think not, but the argument of this paper doesn't require any sort 
of demonstration of the incompatibility of relationalist with representationalist 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 McGinn (1999) seems to have thought that seeing that a is F is a matter of being 
visually aware of a fact, but I find French (2012) and Ranalli’s (2014) arguments to the 
contrary to be persuasive.  For further arguments that we don’t see facts, see 
Moltmann (2013). 
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approaches to perceptual experience. My aim is simply to show that there's no good 
reason to think that perception’s power to provide knowledge doesn’t derive from its 
power to provide reasons. 
 
3.3  A Third Reconciliatory View? 
McDowell has backed off the idea that when we see that a is F, this is a matter of being 
made visually aware of the fact that a is F. Facts, he now concedes, aren't things that we 
see or perceive.24  He was moved to abandon this view by Travis' observation that 
everything we perceive in our surroundings is particular. Nevertheless, he wants to 
retain the idea that our conceptual capacities are active in experience. Whereas the 
relationalist wants to say that conceptual capacities play no role in bringing the 
particulars we see into view and only are active when it comes to judging that 
something brought into view is an instance of some kind, the reconciliatory view says 
that such conceptual capacities must be active for perception to bring into view what it 
brings into view. The actualization of such capacities is essential to experience and 
doesn't merely operate on the particulars that are present in experience anyway. 
 Let's consider a third reconciliatory view, one that seems to avoid the 
difficulties above by jettisoning the idea that the perceptual relation has facts as one of 
its relata: 
The Third Reconciliatory View: What we see isn't ever a 
fact or something that's true. Nevertheless, conceptual 
capacities are active in experience and the things we see 
are presented as being instances of kinds or as having 
properties. The conceptual capacities do not operate on 
things that are present in experience anyway; rather, they 
are active in bringing particulars into experience and so 
into view.  It is because these things are brought into 
view, in part, because of the operation of these conceptual 
capacities, our predicative judgments are based on 
reasons.25   
Against this proposal, I shall argue that it's a mistake to think of the representational 
character of experience as essential to perceptual knowledge. It's essential to the an 
account of perceptual knowledge that says that such knowledge arises because our 
perceptual judgments are based on reasons, but that shows that it's not essential to our 
understanding of perceptual knowledge that it's constituted by beliefs based on 
reasons: 
The Problem of Transduction 
1. If we're not visually aware of facts, either experience 
has no propositional content or there's a 
transductive process that takes non-propositional 
input (e.g., an object seen) and yields a propositional 
content for visual experience.  
2. If the former, the propositional content of 
experience isn't epistemically essential because we 
have perceptual knowledge.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 See McDowell (2009, Chp. 14). 
25 This seems to be closer to Ginsborg (2011) and McDowell (2009). 
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3. If the latter, the propositional content of experience 
isn't epistemically essential because there's a 
possible creature with our perceptual knowledge 
that acquires this knowledge without this 
intervening process yielding a propositional content 
of experience. Instead, there's a transductive process 
that takes non-propositional input and yields 
content for visual belief.  
4. If we're not visually aware of facts, the propositional 
content of experience isn't epistemically essential.   
5. We're not visually aware of facts. 
6. The propositional content of experience isn't 
epistemically essential. 
The guiding thought is that if we think of perception as fundamentally being a relation 
between the perceiver and the particulars that she sees, the experience she has will 
only have representational content the accuracy of which turns on how things are with 
this perceived particular if there's some process that yields a content by taking in the 
particulars we see and generating some sort of content from that.  At the ground level, 
what's taken in would have to be something we see if indeed the perception grounds 
the representational character of the experience.  Once we see this, it's hard to see what 
reason there could be for thinking that this transductive process that takes something 
non-propositional in and yields something that's the kind of content that can bear 
logical relations to belief couldn't simply yield a belief's content as opposed to an 
experience's content.  If the aim is to acquire knowledge, I see no advantage for wiring 
things up one way rather than another. 
 On the pure relationalist view that I’d favor, what’s present in experience is 
always particular and so a’s belonging to the range of cases that makes for an F’s being 
present cannot be present to the perceiver through her conscious experience of a.  
What is present is something of a’s that merits the classification of a as being an F. The 
perceiver’s knowledge that a is F depends upon whether she has the ability to classify 
things as F when aware of the features of a that merit this classification.  It doesn’t 
require some representation of a as being F that’s prior to belief or judgment.   
By contrast, the proponents of the third reconciliatory view insist that the 
understanding and the conceptual capacities do not operate upon some particulars 
that sensibility anyway brings into view without the operation of these conceptual 
capacities. They think these particulars are only brought into view by an exercise of 
these capacities in concert with the operation of sensibility.  Since they think that the 
experience and its representational character is grounded in how things are with the 
particulars brought into view, they must think that the understanding and our 
conceptual capacities operate on something particular in generating an experience 
with that content and an experience the accuracy of which turns on how things are 
with the particulars we ultimately see.  What’s most unclear is what advantage there is 
in saying that the conceptual capacities operate on particulars in generating the 
experience and its representational character as opposed to saying that conceptual 
capacities operate on the particulars present in experience through the operation of 
sensibility alone.   
 So far, the problem is merely a challenge. The challenge can be met if someone 
can produce an argument that shows that there must be some sort of suitable 
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representational content in place that would then play a role in explaining why the 
subject believes what she does.  It's hard to imagine how this challenge might be met, 
but let's push this worry a bit further.  One way to get representation into the picture if 
you're skeptical of the idea that experience is itself representational is to introduce 
recognitional abilities into the picture as something that operates upstream from the 
experience on the things that experience puts us in touch with anyway, quite 
independently from the exercise of any conceptual capacities. On this model, a subject 
sees an object, a, and the perceptual experience the subject has of a just is the subject 
seeing a. There are recognitional capacities upstream from belief that account for the 
subject's disposition to judge that a is an F. The alternative model that the proponents 
of reasons-first defend is this. The subject sees an object, a, and has a perceptual 
experience as of a's being F. The experience has a representational character 
determined, in part, by a and, in part, by the subject's discriminatory and recognitional 
capacities. These capacities account for the subject's disposition to judge that a is an F. 
 The main differences between these accounts are these. The first view doesn't 
see experience as having a representational character shaped by the exercise of 
conceptual or recognitional capacities, but the second one does and sees the operation 
of these capacities as playing an epistemic role by fixing the content of that experience.  
I think that this second view is the sort of thing that Ginsborg has in mind when she 
offers this example:  
[I]magine two people who have different discriminative 
capacities with respect to the experience of music. One 
can discriminate among chords of different qualities (for 
example, major, minor, and diminished triads), the other 
among the timbres of different but related instruments 
(cornet, trumpet, saxophone). It is natural to think that 
each of them, listening to the same major chord played by 
a saxophone trio, will hear it differently. Because the first 
is, as we might put it, sensitive to the harmonic qualities 
of what she is hearing but not to the timbre, her 
experience will register its character of being a major 
triad. The experience of the second, conversely, will 
register the characteristic saxophone sound of the chord, 
but not its harmonic quality (2011: 151).  
If her proposal is correct, a certain feature of the sound is present in the experience 
because of the operation of a discriminatory capacity (which may or may not be a 
recognitional capacity), but the third reconciliatory view says that what's present in the 
experience will be the particular sounds the subjects hear. In contrast, any difference 
between the two subjects' experiences, the relational view says, will be upstream from 
experience and will not have any bearing on the representational content of the 
experience. 
 The proponents of this third reconciliatory view face a trilemma.  What is the 
basis of the relevant predication when the subject makes a perceptual judgment?  If the 
subject judges, say, that some sphere is red, some chord is a minor chord, some wine is 
acidic, etc., should we say that the basis of the predication is (a) something particular 
that’s present in experience, (b) something representational, or (c) something present 
in experience that's representational? 
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 It looks like we can strike (c) from the list.  It was agreed upon by all sides that 
the way for defenders of the reconciliatory view to reconcile the representational 
character of experience with relationalism is to acknowledge that what we see is not 
general.  What (c), says, is that the basis for the predicative judgment is both seen and 
representational. This is a mythical beast, one that would have to straddle Frege's line. 
 What about (a)? The trouble with this is that if we say that the basis for the 
predication you make when you judge that, say, this sphere is red, this chord is a minor 
chord, or this wine is acidic, we're saying that the basis for the predication is something 
particular, something that cannot stand in the kinds of logical relations that reasons 
do. If the basis is the particular, there couldn't be something that is your reason for 
predicating this property of this particular.  This is fatal to the representationalist view, 
but it's a view that I have a soft spot for as I prefer the first view to the second. 
 What about (b)?  If we opt for (b), can't we save the reasons-first view by putting 
representation back into the picture? Putting representation back into the picture 
comes at a cost. You cannot have predication done for a reason unless there's 
something general that's a suitable representation that guides the predication, but if 
the basis for the predication is something suitably general and representational, notice 
that this implies that the basis for the predication is not present in perceptual 
consciousness.  
 Imagine staring at a red sphere in your hand. You have a choice.  You can think 
of what's present to consciousness as the basis for judging that this is red, in which 
case, the predication of redness isn't something done for a reason. You can think of the 
predication as done for a reason, but the reason for which you'd predicate redness of 
the ball isn't something visible and it isn't part of something visible.  Of the two 
approaches, the first strikes me as being more plausible. At some point between you 
and the ball, representation comes into the picture, but the part of the representation 
that has to do with predication isn't itself ever made visible. Thus, it is hard to see how 
something representational is your basis (even in part) for predicating anything of 
anything.   
 If the third reconciliatory view cannot deliver the goods for the proponents of 
reasons-first epistemology, none can.  There cannot be a fourth view that does what 
the previous views cannot for any modification to the views considered thus far will 
either take the objects of visual awareness to be facts or particulars and we've seen that 
none of these views can help the proponents of the reasons-first view make sense of 
the idea that our perceptual beliefs are based on reasons.  There is nothing provided 
by perception alone that could be your reason for believing things, doing things, or 
feeling things, so knowledge is epistemically distinctive. Of course, perception helps us 
acquire knowledge, but it doesn't do so by providing us reasons that could be in our 
possession prior to or independent from the possession of perceptual knowledge.   
 
4. Evidence and Justification 
I've focused thus far on the relationship between knowledge and the possession of 
evidence or reasons, but haven't said much about the relationship between knowledge 
and the attainment of an epistemic status like justification.  I'll conclude with a brief 
discussion of the relationship between reasons and status.   
 On the traditional view of things, justified beliefs are beliefs based on good 
reasons. This view requires that there's a way of having or possessing reasons that 
doesn't involve the target belief, the belief whose justificatory standing is supposed to 
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be explained in terms of the rational support of the relevant reasons.  So much for that 
view!  In the non-inferential case, your belief that p cannot be justified by being based 
on some reasons that you'd possess independently.  In the non-inferential case, there's 
nothing that could be your reason for believing p.26  
 Let's consider a different approach to the relationship between reasons and 
epistemic status.  Consider a simple closure principle for justification:  
J-Closure: If you justifiably believe X and know that Y is a 
logical consequence of X, you can justifiably infer Y if 
your come to believe Y by means of competent deduction. 
A natural explanation of J-Closure is one that appeals to this connection between the 
justificatory status of a belief and reasons:   
J-Reasons: If you justifiably believe X and can justifiably 
infer X's known consequences, you'd be able to φ for the 
reason that X. 
To get a feel for J-Reasons, suppose you justifiably believe that Agnes was the one who 
finished off the gin.  This belief might be inferential or non-inferential. If it’s 
inferential, it might be based on deductive reasoning or some sort of non-deductive 
reasoning. All we know about this belief is that it’s justifiably held.  It could, 
presumably, be justifiably held even if you have lost the original grounds for forming 
it.  Suppose you deduce that Agnes once drank gin.  What J-Reasons says, in effect, is 
that if this is something that you can justifiably believe, in part, because you justifiably 
believe that Agnes was the one who finished off the gin and because you can justifiably 
believe all manner of known consequences of the first belief, you’re able to believe, 
feel, or do something for the reason that Agnes was the one who finished off the gin.   
 If J-Reasons is part of the best explanation of J-Closure, perhaps we should 
accept it.  The idea would be that competent deduction transmits a status (i.e., 
justification) because beliefs that attain that status enable you to believe further things 
for reasons.  If this idea is correct, it has a rather surprising consequence.  If this idea is 
correct, the distinction between justification and knowledge breaks down.  
 J-Reasons implies this surprising thesis:  
J-K: If you justifiably believe X, you know X. 
This is because of this link between ability and knowledge:  
A-K: You cannot φ for the reason that X unless you know 
X. 
Once we see that you cannot φ for the reason that X unless you know X, we can see that 
you cannot justifiably believe what you don't know.27  Justified beliefs are beliefs that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 In saying that there's nothing that's your reason for believing, say, Agnes is on the 
sofa if this belief is non-inferential, I'm not saying that there's no reason why you 
believe this. There is. You see her and you recognize her.  Such things can explain why 
you believe and explain how you know without being your reasons for believing 
anything at all.  You needn't have any attitude whatever to such things for them to 
explain why you believe or how you know, but they couldn't be your reason for 
anything if you didn't have any attitude toward them.    
27 This view has been defended by McDowell (1998), Steglich-Petersen (2013), Sutton 
(2007), Unger (1975), and Williamson (forthcoming) although the arguments that these 
authors offer differ from the one offered here. I believe that this is the first attempt to 
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provide you with reasons that can be your reasons for believing things, feeling things, 
doing things. If you believe, feel, or do things for reasons, these reasons must be 
known. Thus, the original belief must itself constitute knowledge.   
 Why is this? Why must beliefs constitute knowledge to be justifiably held?  The 
obvious answer is that the justificatory status of a belief depends upon whether it can 
provide rational support by providing us with reasons. It seems that a plausible 
candidate for the fundamental norm of belief is one that tells us that beliefs are 
supposed to provide us with reasons:  
RN: You shouldn’t believe p unless your belief that p is 
true can provide you with reasons that can be your 
reasons for φ-ing.28 
It turns out that only knowledge can play this role in providing reasons. Since only 
knowledgeable beliefs do that, we now know why belief is governed by this norm:  
KN: You shouldn’t believe p unless you know p. 
Since these norms determine what’s justified, right, permitted, appropriate, etc., the 
best you can hope for if you believe what you don’t know is an excuse. 
 We now have the beginning of an argument for the claim that knowledge is the 
fundamental norm of belief, one that explains why we should think of the aim of belief 
as knowledge, not merely truth.29  Once we see that knowledge, not perception, is what 
provides us with reasons, we can see that possessing evidence requires a commitment 
to truth that's not present in perceptual contact with our surroundings. In turn, we 
have to think of the justificatory status of beliefs as turning on what support these 
beliefs can provide, not exclusively on what supports these beliefs. 
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